Indonesia’s shift to Turkey’s KAAN fighter jet stirs buzz (2025)

On April 10, 2025, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto announced his country’s interest in joining Turkey’s ambitious KAAN fighter jet program, a next-generation combat aircraft still in development, while also expressing a desire to leverage Turkey’s growing defense industry for Indonesia’s submarine efforts.

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Speaking during a recent engagement, as reported by Clash Reports, Subianto stated, “We want to take part in Türkiye’s fifth-generation national fighter jet project, KAAN. Likewise, we aim to benefit from Türkiye’s defense industry in our submarine program.”

This declaration made public through a post on X by Clash Reports, signals a potential shift in Indonesia’s defense strategy and underscores Turkey’s rising prominence as a player in the global arms market.

For the United States, a nation deeply invested in the Indo-Pacific region and its own advanced fighter jet programs, this development raises questions about alliances, technology proliferation, and the evolving balance of power in Asia.

The KAAN project, spearheaded by Turkish Aerospace Industries [TAI], represents Turkey’s bid to join an elite group of nations capable of producing fifth-generation fighter jets. Designed to replace aging F-16s in Turkey’s air force, KAAN—formerly known as the TF-X—aims to deliver stealth capabilities, advanced avionics, and superior maneuverability.

The aircraft is still in its prototype phase, with its maiden flight occurring in February 2023, and full operational capability not expected until the early 2030s. Powered initially by General Electric F110 engines, the same as those used in American F-16s, Turkey has plans to develop an indigenous engine to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers.

The jet boasts a sleek, angular design intended to minimize radar detection, a top speed projected at Mach 1.8, and a combat radius of approximately 600 nautical miles. Its sensor suite is expected to include an active electronically scanned array [AESA] radar, infrared search-and-track systems, and integration with networked drones, reflecting cutting-edge trends in modern aerial warfare.

Indonesia’s interest in KAAN comes at a time when the nation is seeking to modernize its military amid growing regional tensions, particularly in the South China Sea. As the largest economy in Southeast Asia and a key member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], Indonesia has historically relied on a mix of Western and Russian equipment.

Its air force currently operates a modest fleet, including American-made F-16s Russian Su-27s, and Su-30s, but many of these platforms are aging and ill-suited to counter the advanced capabilities of potential adversaries like China, which fields the stealthy J-20.

Subianto, a former general who assumed the presidency in October 2024, has made military modernization a cornerstone of his administration, pledging to increase defense spending to 1.5% of GDP by 2029, up from less than 1% in recent years, according to a report by The Strategist.

Turkey’s appeal as a defense partner for Indonesia lies in its unique position outside the traditional superpower blocs. Unlike the United States, which imposes strict export controls on its F-35 Lightning II, or Russia, whose arms sales often come with geopolitical strings, Turkey offers a middle path.

Over the past two decades, Ankara has aggressively expanded its defense sector, reducing its foreign dependency from 80% in 2002 to just 20% by 2022, as noted by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a statement reported by Kompas.id.

Companies like Roketsan and Aselsan have gained international recognition for producing drones, missiles, and electronics, while TAI’s work on KAAN showcases Turkey’s ambition to compete with global leaders. For Indonesia, partnering with Turkey could mean access to advanced technology without the political baggage of aligning too closely with Washington, Beijing, or Moscow.

This potential collaboration also reflects a broader strategic calculus for Jakarta. The Indo-Pacific region is increasingly contested, with China’s military buildup and assertive maritime claims putting pressure on neighboring states.

Indonesia, while officially non-aligned, has sought to bolster its deterrence capabilities without provoking its larger neighbor. Turkey, a NATO member yet often at odds with its Western allies, presents an attractive option.

Its defense industry emphasizes technology transfer and co-production—principles Erdogan has championed as a way to build “mutually beneficial” relationships, as he stated during a 2023 industry fair.

This aligns with Subianto’s vision of enhancing Indonesia’s own defense industrial base, a goal he pursued as defense minister by inking deals for drones and tanks with Turkish firms.

What Indonesia brings to the table is equally significant. As a nation of over 270 million people with a growing economy, it offers financial resources and a strategic foothold in Southeast Asia. Its experience in maritime operations, honed by its vast archipelago of more than 17,000 islands, could prove valuable for Turkey’s submarine program.

Indonesia has prior experience in international defense projects, notably its partnership with South Korea on the KF-21 Boramae fighter jet. That collaboration, launched in 2014, aimed to produce a 4.5-generation fighter, with Indonesia contributing 20% of the development costs—roughly $1.6 billion.

However, funding disputes and delays led Jakarta to scale back its involvement, suggesting a possible shift in priorities under Subianto, who has expressed a preference for purchasing proven systems over co-developing untested ones.

The KAAN itself merits closer examination, given its central role in this story. Unlike the F-35, which relies heavily on stealth and sensor fusion, or the Russian Su-57, which prioritizes speed and agility, KAAN aims for a balanced profile.

Its design draws inspiration from Western fighters—its silhouette echoes the F-22 Raptor—but Turkey has tailored it to its own needs, such as interoperability with its growing fleet of armed drones like the Bayraktar TB2. The jet’s stealth features include radar-absorbent materials and an internal weapons bay, though experts question whether it will match the F-35’s low observability.

Its AESA radar, under development by Aselsan, promises advanced targeting capabilities, while plans for a twin-engine configuration suggest robust performance at high altitudes. Compared to China’s J-20, which boasts a larger airframe and longer range, KAAN is smaller and potentially more affordable, a key consideration for nations like Indonesia that lack the budgets of major powers.

Historically, Turkey and Indonesia have maintained cordial ties, rooted in shared Muslim-majority identities and a mutual interest in asserting independence from Western dominance. Defense cooperation began in earnest with a 2010 agreement that saw Indonesia’s Pindad and Turkey’s FNSS jointly develop the Kaplan MT tank, delivered in 2023.

More recently, in February 2025, Subianto hosted Erdogan in Bogor, where the two leaders signed deals to co-produce drones and expand trade. These milestones provide a foundation for deeper collaboration, though the KAAN project would mark a significant escalation in scope and ambition.

For the United States, this development carries implications that extend beyond a single aircraft. The F-35, produced by Lockheed Martin, remains the gold standard for fifth-generation fighters, with over 900 delivered to allies like Japan and Australia by early 2025.

Yet its high cost—around $80 million per unit—and restrictive export conditions have frustrated some partners. Turkey was famously expelled from the F-35 program in 2019 after purchasing Russian S-400 air defense systems, a decision that spurred its push for KAAN.

If Turkey succeeds in marketing KAAN as a viable alternative, it could erode America’s dominance in the fighter jet market, particularly among nations wary of U.S. influence. Indonesia’s pivot toward Turkey might also signal a broader realignment in the Indo-Pacific, where middle powers are increasingly hedging their bets.

The submarine angle adds another layer of complexity. Turkey has built a robust naval industry, producing Type 214 submarines under license from Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. These diesel-electric boats, equipped with air-independent propulsion, offer a 1,200-nautical-mile range and can deploy torpedoes and anti-ship missiles.

Indonesia, which operates a small fleet of aging submarines—including German Type 209s and South Korean Chang Bogo-class boats—sees Turkey as a partner to expand its underwater capabilities. This aligns with Subianto’s focus on maritime security, given Indonesia’s need to patrol its sprawling exclusive economic zone against illegal fishing and potential Chinese incursions.

Looking at the global landscape, KAAN’s emergence could reshape the fifth-generation fighter market. The F-35’s competitors include Russia’s Su-57, which has seen limited production due to technical issues, and China’s J-20, which remains shrouded in secrecy but is believed to number over 200 units.

France and Germany are developing the Future Combat Air System [FCAS], while Japan’s F-X program aims for a sixth-generation jet by the 2030s. KAAN, if successful, might carve out a niche as a cost-effective option, potentially attracting buyers in the Middle East or Africa. Indonesia’s involvement could amplify this effect, lending credibility and opening doors to ASEAN markets.

Yet challenges abound. KAAN’s development has faced delays and cost overruns, with estimates pegging the program at over $10 billion. Turkey’s reliance on foreign components, like the F110 engine, exposes it to supply chain risks, especially amid tensions with NATO allies.

For Indonesia, committing to an unproven platform carries financial and operational uncertainties, particularly when compared to off-the-shelf options like France’s Rafale, which Jakarta ordered in 2022. Subianto’s decision may hinge on whether Turkey can deliver on its promises of technology transfer and co-production, a sticking point in past deals like the KF-21.

From an analytical perspective, this move by Indonesia and Turkey suggests a subtle but significant shift in global defense dynamics. It’s not just about acquiring hardware; it’s about building a partnership that sidesteps the traditional power centers of Washington, Moscow, and Beijing.

For the U.S., the challenge is maintaining influence in a region where allies are diversifying their options. Subianto’s outreach to Turkey reflects a pragmatic streak—he’s less interested in ideological alignment than in securing tools for Indonesia’s defense.

Turkey, meanwhile, gains a foothold in Asia, bolstering its credentials as an emerging arms exporter. Whether this collaboration will yield a game-changing fighter jet or fizzle amid technical hurdles remains unclear.

Could KAAN redefine aerial warfare for middle powers, or will it stumble like so many ambitious projects before it? The answer lies in the years ahead, as prototypes take flight and geopolitics evolve.

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